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iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, from
which this appeal arises, is based on U.C.A. § 78-3-4(1) (1953 as amended). Jurisdiction
to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. § 782a-3(2)(e) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the State of Utah fail to comply with its plea agreement with defendant
Jeffrey Smit where the plea agreement read, "the State will recommend that any sentence
imposed be suspended and that I be granted probation," where Mr. Smif s attorney
represented to the court, without objection from the prosecutor, that the State was not
seeking jail time, where the State, through the prosecutor and through State of Utah Adult
Probation and Parole, thereafter recommended Mr. Smit serve three months in jail to
"give him a wake up call," and where the prosecutor, after an objection from Mr. Smit's
attorney, stated, "the State is prepared to withdraw its recommendation of—affirmative
recommendation for jail?"
This issue was preserved for appeal in Mr. Smit's Motion to Withdraw Plea and
the hearing on that motion, R. at 82; R. at 320.
Standard of Rreview: Review of trial court's legal determinations is for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996). Whether a particular breach is
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material is a conclusion of law to be reviewed independently. Saunders v. Sharp, 840
P.2d 796 (Utah App. 1992).
2. Does the phrase, "the State will recommend that any sentence imposed be
suspended and that I be granted probation" allow the state to recommend jail time as a
term of probation?
This issue was preserved for appeal in Mr. Smit's Motion to Withdraw Plea and
the hearing on that motion, R. at 82; R. at 320.
Standard of Review: Review of trial court's legal determinations is for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996).
3. Does noncompliance by the State of its plea agreement with Mr. Smit serve as
"good cause" to allow Mr. Smit to withdraw his plea agreement?
This issue was preserved for appeal in Mr. Smit's Motion to Withdraw Plea and
the hearing on that motion, R. at 82; R. at 320.
Standard of review: An appellate court "will not interfere with a trial judge's
determination that a defendant has failed to show good cause unless it clearly appears that
the trial judge abused his discretion." State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422 (Utah 1987). An
appellate court '"will not disturb the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea unless it clearly appears that the trial court has exceeded its permitted range of
discretion.
4. Did the trial court fail to strictly comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure when it failed to divulge the maximum sentence of jail time
2

defendant could serve as part of probation, where the court did divulge the maximum
imprisonment term of the specific charge, being five years, but where the court knew the
defendant qualified for probation and also had signed a plea agreement where the
prosecution promised to recommend probation, and where the court acknowledged that
the two types of imprisonment were distinct and separate?
This issue was not preserved for appeal at the trial court, but it is argued herein
that the court committed plain error.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court committed plain error by accepting a
guilty plea without conducting an appropriate and required colloquy is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 186, 5 P.3d
1222 (Utah App. 2000). "The ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly
complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Ostler, 2000 Utah Ct. App.
028, 996 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 2000).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:...
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be
imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences;
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§77-18-1 (8)(a), Utah Code Annotated
While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant: (a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums , any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support his is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by the court
as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the
compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.

§76-3-203(2), Utah Code Annotated
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as follows:...
(c) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed five years, but if
the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall sentence the person convicted for
a term of not less than one year nor more than five years, and the court may sentence the
person convicted for a term of not less than one year nor more than ten years.

§76-3-208, Utah Code Annotated
(1) persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be committed to the following custodial
authorities:
(a) felony commitments shall be to the Utah State Prison;

§77-13-6, Utah Code Annotated
(2) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and
with leave of the court.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Course of Proceedings
Jeffrey Smit was charged by the State of Utah with two counts of criminal nonsupport, a third degree felony. R. at 5. Mr. Smit pled "not guilty." R. at 46. The State
and Mr. Smit entered into a plea agreement whereby Mr. Smit would change his plea of
"not guilty" to "guilty" to one count of criminal non-support. R. at 55. The court
accepted the plea. R. at 317. Mr. Smit was sentenced to, among other things, 90 days in
jail as part of probation. R. at 318, p. 9, lines 16-17. Mr. Smit motioned to withdraw his
plea based on the failure by the state to comply with the plea agreement. R. at 82; R. at
320. That motion was denied. R. at 122. This appeal then ensued. R. at 123.
Statement of Relevant Facts
Jeffrey Smit was charged by the State of Utah with two counts of criminal nonsupport, a third degree felony. R. at 5. Mr. Smit pled "not guilty." R. at 46. After
negotiations, the State and Mr. Smit entered into a plea agreement whereby Mr. Smit
would change his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty" to one count of criminal non-support.
Additionally the State would recommend that "any sentence imposed be suspended and
that [Mr. Smit] be granted probation." R. at 60. The court accepted the plea. R. at 317.
At the time the court accepted the plea, it advised Mr. Smit the maximum prison
sentence was five years, but made no mention of the one-year maximum jail sentence if
he received probation. R. at 317, p. 5, lines 15-17. Also at the plea agreement the court
asked if anything had been promised in return for the guilty plea. R. at 317, p. 5, line 22
- p. 6, line 6. In response, Mr. Smit's attorney, Mr. Heineman, explained "the State is
5

not seeking any jail time in sentencing in this matter/' without any objection from the
prosecutor. R. at 317, p. 6, lines 15-17.
Two months later, at the sentencing hearing, State of Utah Adult Probation and
Parole recommended Mr. Smit serve three months in jail. R. at 65, p. 11. Heineman
objected to the recommendation as being in violation of the plea agreement, but again,
the prosecutor said nothing. R. at 319, p. 6, line 24 - p. 7, line 4. Later in the sentencing
hearing, after the prosecutor had put forward the evidence against Mr. Smit, she
recommended Mr. Smit "do a minimum of at least three months, if not six months in jail.
That will give him a chance to think about what has happened, to give him a wake up call
that this is an important area that he needs to take care of." R. at 319, p. 6 line 24 - p. 7,
line 3. Again Heineman objected and the court took a break for the parties too review the
audio tape of the Change-of-Plea hearing. R. at 319, p. 16, line 14 - p. 17, line 5.
During the break only Heineman reviewed the tape. R. at 318, p. 2, lines 19-24.
When Heineman offered to play it, the prosecutor said, "Your Honor, the state is
prepared to withdraw its recommendation of—affirmative recommendation for jail." R.
at 318, p. 3, lines 1-5. Mr. Smit was sentenced to, among other things, 90 days in jail as
part of probation. R. at 318, p. 9, lines 16-17.
Mr. Smit motioned to withdraw his plea based on the failure by the state to comply
with the plea agreement. R. at 82; R. at 320. That motion was denied for lack of good
cause. R. at 122. This appeal then ensued. R. at 123.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court wrongfully accepted Jeffrey Smit's guilty plea and wrongfully
denied his motion to withdraw his plea for two reasons. First the State failed to comply
with its promises contained in the plea agreement. Specifically, it recommended Mr.
Smit serve time in jail despite a promise not to make such a recommendation. Second,
the court failed to advise Mr. Smit of the maximum sentence of one year in jail if put on
probation.
The State's promise not to recommend jail was clear both from the plea agreement
itself, where it affirmed the State would recommend that any sentence imposed be
suspended and that Mr. Smit be granted probation, and from the Change-of-Plea hearing,
where Heineman explained, without objection from the prosecutor, that the State was not
seeking jail time.
The State clearly violated the agreement when first, State of Utah Adult Probation
and Parole recommended Mr. Smit serve three months in jail, and second, when the
prosecutor recommended Mr. Smit serve at least three months, if not six months in jail,
and she gave reasons why he should spend time in jail. Such a breach of the agreement
could not simply be corrected by the prosecutor's later statement that the State was
prepared to withdraw the jail recommendation. It was an abuse of the court's discretion
not to allow Mr. Smit to withdraw his plea after such great breach of the agreement.
Finally, because it was possible that Mr. Smit be sentenced to jail as part of
probation, the court erred in failing to advise him of the maximum sentence he could
serve as part of that probation. Thus. Mr. Smit had good cause to withdraw his plea.
7

ARGUMENT
The trial court wrongfully accepted Jeffrey Smit's guilty plea and wrongfully
denied his motion to withdraw his plea for two reasons. First, after the State entered into
a plea agreement with Mr. Smit whereby the State would recommend a suspended
sentence and probation, and after Mr. Smit's attorney explained to the court that the State
was not seeking jail time for Mr. Smit, and the State did not object, the State vehemently
recommended Mr. Smit serve at least three months in jail, even though the prosecutor
later told the court she was prepared to withdraw the recommendation. Second, the trial
court failed to explain to Mr. Smit that he could receive a maximum sentence of one year
in jail as part of probation, in violation of Utah law and the United States Constitution.
1. THE STATE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT
Before determining whether the State breached the agreement, the Court must first
understand what the terms of the agreement are.
A.

The state promised, at the least, not to recommend jail.
The State of Utah, represented by Janise Macanas, the prosecutor, entered into a

plea agreement with Mr. Smit, dated March 12, 2002, whereby Mr. Smit would change
his plea in this case from "not guilty" to "guilty." R. at 55.
The plea agreement (also called "statement in advance of plea") reads,
"I [Jeff Smit]1 will plead guilty to the Count 1 of the Information and
agree that victim restitution be entered in the total amount of my child
support arrears for Count 1 and Count II for my children as of the date
Although the plea agreement reads as though Mr. Smit wrote it, the agreement was in
fact written by the prosecutor for the State of Utah and signed by her on behalf of the
State. R. at 55.
8

sentence is imposed. In return, the State will recommend that any sentence
imposed be suspended and that I be granted probation. Further, upon my
successful completion of probation, the State will join in a motion to reduce
the degree of my conviction to that of a class "A" misdemeanor." (R. at 60;
emphasis added).
At the Change-of-Plea Hearing, which occurred on the same day the plea
agreement was signed, Mr. Smit's attorney Robert Heineman explained what the State
had promised. The discussion proceeded as follows:
"The Court: Ms. Macanas. What is anticipated?
Mr. Heineman: We have a disposition in this particular matter.
What's contemplated is that on a plea of guilty to Count 1, the State will
dismiss Count 2. (R. at 317, p. 2, lines 8 - 12).

The Court: Has anyone threatened you to get you to enter this plea?
Coerced you in some way?
Mr. Smit: No
The Court: Promised you something? In terms of your agreement
with the State of Utah, other than dismissing Count 2 if you pled guilty to
Count 1, is there anything further to the agreement?
Mr. Heineman: There are a couple of things, your Honor.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Heineman: One is that Alex Beesley is willing to waive interest
if there's a lump sum payment of all arrearages within the year.
Additionally, the State has agreed that if he successfully completes
probation, they would stipulate to a 402 reduction in Class A misdemeanor,
and additionally, the State is not seeking any jail time in sentencing in this
matter. (R. at 317, p. 5, line 25 - p. 6, line 17; emphasis added).

Ms. Macanas: Your Honor, just for clarification also.
9

The Court: Yes.
Ms. Macanas: Although Count 2 is being dismissed, the defendant
has agreed to pay restitution on those as well." (R. at 317, p. 7, lines 4 - 8).
Macanas made no further clarifications of Heineman's explanation of the plea agreement.
At the sentencing hearing, both the prosecutor and State of Utah Adult Probation
and Parole (hereinafter, "UAP&P") recommended Mr. Smit serve three months in jail,
UAP&P's recommendation being couched in terms of a condition of probation. (R. at
319, p. 14, line 24 - p. 15, line 3; R. at 65, p. 11). After Mr. Smit complained about the
State's recommendation for jail time as being in violation of the plea agreement, the court
stated,
"I think that the agreement was—and I'm looking at the statement in
advance of plea, that any sentence imposed be suspended and that I be
granted probation. That does not in fact, of course, being granted probation
implies that there would be conditions of probation and one of the
conditions that I thought appropriate was this jail time; but I think beyond
that—so, I disagree with your interpretation that a recommendation to
suspend the sentence would be a recommendation to suspend going to
prison. And there is nothing said here in terms of any recommendations for
the particular conditions of probation." R. at 320, p. 8, lines 1-12.
The court further explained,
"As I say, the way I see it happening here and the facts as I see it and
what I would find is that the initial bargain or at least the one expressed in
the statement in advance of plea was that their recommendation should
be—would be to suspend the jail sentence. That's separate and apart from
the conditions of probation, making recommendations for the conditions of
probation. R. at 320, p. 10, line 25 - p. 11, line 6.
Moreover the court stated,
"that a recommendation to suspend the jail sentence, or to suspend
the sentence can only be interpreted to mean to suspend the prison
10

sentence, not to send the defendant to prison. It does not deal with the
conditions of probation. This jail sentence that I've imposed is a condition
of probation." R. at 320, p. 12, lines 1 - 7.
In other words, a promise by the State to recommend a suspended sentence and probation
does not prohibit the state from recommending jail as part of the probation. The court
also makes a distinction between "prison" and "jail," and associates the promise to
recommend a "suspended sentence" only with a promise to recommend suspending a
prison sentence, not with a promise to recommend suspending a jail sentence.
The trial court did find, however, the State had promised to recommend Mr.
Smit's probation not include jail, based on the uncontested comment of Heineman at the
Change-of-Plea hearing, as quoted above. R. at 318, p. 3, lines 6-11. At the hearing on
Mr. Smit's motion to withdraw the plea, the court explained,
"however—and I do recall this, apparently what happened was that
at the time the plea was taken, the State had said some things in addition to
what was said in the statement in advance of plea. And those comments—
and maybe they were and maybe they weren't intended as such—but they
did—it would indicate that they were not going to recommend, or they
were going to recommend maybe affirmatively no jail time, which would
include conditions of probation that would be jail time. R. at 320, p. 8,
lines 1 3 - 2 0
continuing, the court stated,
"During the hearing, further things were said that changed that
recommendation, that their recommendation really was going to be also
that as one of the conditions of probation should not be jail." R. at 320, p.
11, lines 7-10.
The court also reasoned,
"however, in this case, representations were made at the time of
taking the plea that added to this written agreement, and that was clarified;
indeed, the State had—and Mr. Heineman pointed that out at the time, that
11

their recommendation really was or was that the bargain—the agreement
was that their recommendation was going to be no jail sentence as one of
the conditions of probation." R. at 320, p. 12, lines 1 - 7.
The State having promised not to recommend jail, the question turns to whether
the State fulfilled that promise.
B. The State did not fulfill its obligations to Mr. Smit
Both the prosecutor and UAP&P recommended Mr. Smit serve three months in
jail. R. at 318, p. 14, line 24 - p. 15, line 3; R. at 65, p. 11. Although the prosecutor later
said she was prepared to withdraw the recommendation, her actions and arguments to that
point, and even her supposed withdrawal of the recommendation, constitute
noncompliance with the agreement, both in terms of contract law and constitutional law.
1. The State of Utah "breached" the agreement.
As stated above, the trial court held althoug the plea agreement by itself did not
prevent the State from recommending jail as part of Mr. Smit's probation, the
uncontested statement of Heineman at the Change-of-Plea hearing did, which means at
the moment UAP&P sent its recommendation that Mr. Smit serve three months in jail,
the State violated the agreement. R. at 65, p. 11. State of Utah Adult Probation and
Parole is undoubtedly an agency of the State of Utah and was bound by the agreement. If
it were not bound, it would have been excepted from the agreement, as the judge was
excepted. R. at 60.
Also, at the moment the prosecutor recommended three to six months in jail, the
State again violated the agreement. R. at 319, p. 14, lines 24-25. And when the
prosecutor gave several reasons why Mr. Smit should go to jail, including, to "give him a
12

chance to think about what has happened/' and to "give him a wake up call" (R. at 319, p.
15, lines 1-2), the prosecutor breached the agreement so far it could not possibly be
repaired (even if the State had a right to repair the breach). The prosecutor somewhat
attempted to cure the breach by telling the court, "the State is prepared to withdraw its
recommendation of—affirmative recommendation for jail," (R. at 318, p. 3, lines 3-5)
after Heineman objected. Yet the prosecutor's statement itself, with the word,
"prepared," demonstrates a reluctance to withdraw the jail recommendation.
That one line is the only evidence in the record that the State attempted to comply
in some way with its obligation not to recommend jail. It was evidently insufficient to
erase in the court's consciousness the State's real recommendation. At the hearing on the
motion to withdraw the plea the court appears to have understood that the State's
recommendation of no jail was given against its wishes. The court noted,
"apparently what happened was that at the time the plea was taken,
the State had said some things in addition to what was said in the statement
in advance of plea. And those comments—and maybe they were and
maybe they weren yt intended as such—but they did—it would indicate that
they were not going to recommend, or they were going to recommend
maybe affirmatively no jail time, which would include conditions of
probation that would be jail time." R. at 320, p. 8, lines 13-20; emphasis
added.
Although whether the court did or did not follow the recommendations of the prosecutor
is irrelevant to the question of whether the State performed its obligations to make certain
recommendations, the court's sentence of three months in jail, which exactly matches the
State's real recommendation before it was reluctantly withdraw, demonstrates the
ineffective nature of the State's attempt to withdraw its jail recommendation.

13

The court also stated, at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, he relied
on other recommendations. R. at 320, p. 12, lines 20-23. No other recommendations are
in the record, unless the court was referring to UAP&P, which as explained above was
bound by the State's promises.
If a party to a contract breaches that contract, the other party has a right to rescind
the contract if the breach is material. Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah
1979). A material breach occurs when the failure of performance "defeats the very object
of the contract or is of such prime importance that the contract would not have been made
if default in that particular had been contemplated." Id. at 451 (quoting Havas v. Alger,
461 P.2d 857 (Nev. 1969)
There can be no doubt that the desire not to be incarcerated is of prime importance
to a defendant. The prosecutor noted, after seeing Mr. Smit's reaction to being sentenced
to 90 days in jail as part of probation, "I think that he was quite surprised that the Court
did go ahead and order some jail time." R. at 320, p. 7, lines 13-14. The fact that Mr.
Smit is still attempting to correct the problem raised by the State's breach, even after he
served the time, testifies to the importance he placed on the State's recommendation of
no jail.
The State's other promise, to dismiss one of the two counts of non-support cannot
be said to be the prime importance, because Mr. Smit still agreed to pay restitution on
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both counts. Additionally, the promise by the State to recommend a suspended sentence
and probation is the first promise listed in the plea agreement. R. at 60.2
Because the State materially breached the plea agreement, Mr. Smit should have
been allowed to withdraw his plea. The trial court's refusal to allow Mr. Smit to rescind
the agreement must be reversed.
If this Court holds the State did technically comply with the agreement, the State
still breached it by acting in bad faith. "As a general rule, every contract is subject to an
implied covenant of good faith. Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which
will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. A
violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to a claim for breach of
contract." Brown v. Moore. 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998) (quoting Brehany v.
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991).
"To comply with the covenant, a party must act consistently with the agreed
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." Prince v. Bear River
Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, Tf27, 56 P.3d 524, 533 (Utah 2002) (quoting St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199, 200 (Utah 1991). The purpose and
expectations of the parties is determined by considering the contract language and the
course of dealings between the parties. St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 200.
2

Although the trial court held the promise to "recommend that any sentence imposed by
suspended and that I be granted probation" (R. at 60) did not equate to a promise to
recommend no jail, it will be shown in this brief that it did.
15

In Prince, the insurance company debated Prince's claim, which Prince argued
was bad faith on the insurance company's part. Prince, 2002 UT atffi[3-5,56 P.3d at 529.
The Prince court reasoned if the insurance company had an arguable reason for denying
Prince's claim, the insurance company would not be acting in bad faith. Id., 2002 UT at
ffl|34,56P.3dat535.
In this case, the State acted in bad faith when it recommended Mr. Smit serve
three to six months in jail. The State did not have an arguable reason for doing so. The
reason the prosecutor gave, with which the judge agreed (R. at 320, p. 12, lines 1-5), is
that "nowhere in the plea agreement was there any mention of whether or not the State
would or would not recommend a jail sentence" (R. at 320, p. 6, lines 2-4), and that there
is a difference between suspending prison time and jail time (R. at 320, p. 7, lines 13-16).
Examining the agreement itself and the course of dealings between the parties, as
directed by St. Benedict's Dev. Co., reveals such an analysis of the agreement by the
prosecutor is unreasonable. Mr. Smit had a justified expectation the State would at the
least not recommend jail, if not affirmatively recommend no jail.
Looking first at the course of dealings between the parties, the prosecutor made no
objection to Heineman's representation at the Change-of Plea hearing that the State was
not seeking jail, even though the prosecutor did clarify another promise after Heineman
had finished speaking. Moreover, after UAP&P recommended a three-month jail term,
Heineman objected on the basis that such a recommendation violated the agreement. If
the prosecutor had misgivings about the defendant's understanding of the agreement, and
if she were acting in good faith, she would have at that time reviewed the record before
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making her jail recommendation. The prosecutor, however, didn't review the record
even after being told to do so by the court. R. at 318, p. 2, lines 9-23.
The most damaging evidence of the State's unreasonableness in recommending
jail is the agreement itself. It reads, "the State will recommend that any sentence
imposed be suspended and that I be granted probation," R. at 60. The word "any" alone
is enough to encompass a possible jail sentence as well as a prison sentence, no matter
what name is given to the jail sentence (in this instance the jail sentence is called
"probation").
The words "suspended" and "sentence" refer to a jail sentence as well as prison
sentence, both commonly and throughout the Utah Code. See U.C.A. §§77-18-8; 77-192; 77-19-3; 41-6-44(4),(5), and (6); 78-32-12.2(4)(c), (5)(a)(iv); 64-13c-101(3). Section
64-13c-101(3) of the Code, in particular, refers to a person who is convicted of a felony
and is given probation in jail, as is the situation in this case. It identifies "jail" for such
probationers as a "sentence." It reads, "'Inmate' means felony probationers sentenced to
county jail under Subsection77-18-l(8) [probation section]." Thus, to suspend any
sentence would be to suspend a jail sentence under probation.
Furthermore, the word "sentence" must have referred to jail as a condition of
probation since Mr. Smit did not qualify for prison time on the sentencing guidelines
chart. R. at 65, p 12; R. at p. 6, lines 8-22. He was as far from the prison category as is
possible.
To conclude or argue that for a defendant to ask that any sentence imposed be
suspended means only to ask for a suspended prison sentence, while leaving open the
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possibility of a jail sentence, violates the basic understanding of the words "any" and
"sentence."
As for the word "probation," notwithstanding U.C.A. §77-18-l(8)(a)(v), which
includes a term in jail as part of probation, and which section was never cited in the plea
agreement or anywhere else in the record, "probation" is defined and understood
commonly as, "the action of suspending the sentence of a convicted offender and giving
him freedom during good behavior under the supervision of a probation officer."
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 937 (Merriam-Webster, 1991). The legal
dictionary also defines "probation" not as "the possibility of jail" but as, "Sentence
imposed for commission of crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is released into
the community under the supervision of a probation officer in lieu of incarceration."
Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), p. 1202 (West Publishing 1990). The definition
continues, "It implies that defendant has a chance to prove himself and its purpose is
reform and rehabilitation. For this purpose the defendant must agree to specified
standards of conduct...; however his violation of such standards subjects his liberty
revocation. Id. at 1202.
The Utah Code may allow the court to use the term "probation" in a manner
opposite its normal definition, but the Code does not give the prosecutor the right to use
the term in that way when entering into agreements with defendants who may not
understand all the special legal implications the Code attaches to it. To do so without
divulging to the defendant that the prosecutor intends to seek jail time cannot be
considered anything but bad faith.
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Because the State materially breached its agreement with Mr. Smit, or because the
State violated its duty of good faith by acting inconsistently with Mr. Smifs justified
expectations, Mr. Smit must be allowed to rescind the plea agreement, consistent with
contract law. The trial court's refusal to do so represents an abuse of its discretion.
2. The State violated Mr. Smit's constitutional rights.
Even if this Court decides Mr. Smit may not revoke his plea based on strict
contract law, the States violation of the plea agreement also violated Mr. Smifs rights to
due process, for which he must be allowed to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court of
the United States has held, "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257,
262, 30 L.Ed.2d 427,433, 92 S.Ct. 495,499 (1971).
In Santobello, the State of New York charged Santobello on two felony counts, to
which he pled not guilty. Id, 404 US at 258, 30 L.Ed.2d at 430, 92 S.Ct. at 497. After
negotiations, the State agreed to allow Santobello to plead to a lesser-included offense,
and promised not to make a sentence recommendation. Id, 404 US at 258, 30 L.Ed.2d at
431, 92 S.Ct. at 497.
After several months of delay and a new prosecutor, the court held a sentencing
hearing wherein the new prosecutor recommended the maximum sentence, citing
Santobello9s criminal record and alleged links with organized crime. Id, 404 US at 259,
30 L.Ed.2d at 431, 92 S.Ct. at 497. Santobello objected that the prosecution had violated
its agreement. Id, 404 US at 259, 30 L.Ed.2d at 431, 92 S.Ct. at 497. The sentencing
19

judge ended the discussion by quoting extensively from the pre-sentence report saying he
was not at all influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation, but decided on the
sentence on his own, sentencing him to the maximum sentence. Id., 404 US at 259, 30
L.Ed.2d at 431, 92 S.Ct at 497.
The New York appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, and Santobello
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. IdL, 404 US at 260, 30 L.Ed.2d at 432, 92
S.Ct. at 498. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to allow
Santobello to be sentenced by a different judge with proper recommendations, or to allow
Santobello to withdraw his plea. Id, 404 US at 263, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
The Court reasoned the promise to not recommend incarceration was material to
the agreement and had been made based on the consideration of Santobello giving up
important constitutional rights. IdL, 404 US at 262, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
The fact that the judge was not influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation was
irrelevant, since the issue pertained only to whether the prosecution upheld its end of the
bargain. Id, 404 US at 260, 30 L.Ed.2d at 432, 92 S.Ct. at 498.
In this case, as in the Santobello case, the defendant Smit pled not guilty to two
felony counts. R. at 46. Also in this case as in the Santobello case, the State agreed to
allow Mr. Smit to change his plea to guilty to something less than the two felony counts,
and promised not to recommend jail. R. at 55; R. at 318, p. 3, lines 6-11. And in this
case as in Santobello, after a couple of months of delay, the prosecutor recommended a
jail sentence contrary to the agreement, and in the process explained why the defendant
should receive jail (in this case the prosecutor said it would help Smit think about what he
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has done and give him a wake up call). R. at 319, p. 14 line 24 - p. 15, line 13. Further,
similar to Santobello, Mr. Smit objected that the prosecution had violated its agreement,
but the sentencing judge explained the record had been corrected, and he, the judge, had
not at all been influenced by the prosecutor's jail recommendation. R. at 320, p. 12, lines
14-23. Finally, as in Santobello, Mr. Smit received the exact sentence that had been
recommended by the prosecutor. R. at 318, p. 9, lines 16-18..
The only real difference between the cases is that after the recommendations from
the prosecutor and UAP&P in this case, the prosecutor stated she was prepared to
withdraw the recommendation. But the language of the Santobello Court's decision
about the irrelevancy of whether the judge says he was influenced by the wrong
recommendation, and the instruction that another judge should do the sentencing (if the
state court decided to enforce the plea agreement), makes it clear that once the prosecutor
has poisoned the court with a recommendation in violation of a plea agreement, simply
allowing the same judge to sentence the defendant or explain that the violating
recommendation had no influence over him, disturbs the interests of justice.
The Court also mentioned that a plea is not voluntary, even if the defendant says it
is, if the prosecutor promises something but does not disclose the essence of that promise.
Id, 404 US at 261, 30 L.Ed.2d at 432, 92 S.Ct. at 498.
Justice Douglas remarked in his concurring opinion that because of the important
constitutional rights being given up, including the right to trial by jury, to confront one's
accusers, to present witnesses in one's defense, to remain silent, and to be convicted by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, guilty pleas obtained unfairly or through ignorance
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should be vacated. Id, 404 US at 264, 30 L.Ed.2d at 434, 92 S.Ct. at 500. Justice
Douglas also declared whether the defendant should be sentenced before another judge or
be allowed to withdraw his plea should be decided with great deference to the wishes of
the defendant, inasmuch as the defendant was the wronged party. Id., 404 US at 267, 30
L.Ed.2d at 436, 92 S.Ct. at 501. Justice Marshall went further, saying, "When a
prosecutor breaks the bargain, he undercuts the basis for the waiver of constitutional
rights implicit in the plea. This it seems to me provides the defendant ample justification
for rescinding the plea." Id, 404 US at 268, 30 L.Ed.2d at 436, 92 S.Ct. at 502.
Considering the foregoing, there can be no doubt that to refuse Mr. Smit some
relief was an abuse of discretion. If Mr. Smit is not allowed to withdraw his plea and
proceed to trial, he should at the minimum be allowed to be sentenced by another judge,
having the prosecution make the appropriate recommendation the he not serve any
sentence, be it prison or jail.
II. THE COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 11
The second reason Mr. Smit must be allowed to withdraw his plea is the trial
court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Because the issue was not preserved at the trial court, Mr. Smit must establish plain error
by the court, demonstrating (1) that an error exists, (2) the error should have been
obvious, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993);
State v. Ostler. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 028, f 8, 996 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah App. 2000); State
v. Tarnawieckt 2000 Utah Ct. App. 186, Tfl 1, 5 P.3d 1222,1226 (Utah App. 2000).

22

A court's failure to strictly, rather than substantially, comply with Rule 11(e)(5)
gives a defendant good cause to withdraw his guilty plea because he entered the plea
unknowingly and involuntarily, and a court that refuses to allow a plea withdrawal after
such failure commits error. Ostler, 2000 Utah Ct. App. at ^|15, 996 P.2d at 1070;
Tarnawiecki 2000 Utah Ct. App. at Tfl2, 5 P.3d at 1226; State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,
476 (Utah App. 1991).
In Ostler, the court failed to explain, among other things, the possible punishments
for the charged crime. Ostler, 2000 Utah Ct. App. at 115, 996 P.2d at 1070. This error
by the court gave Ostler good cause to withdraw his guilty plea. Id., at 2000 Utah Ct.
App. at Tfl5, 996 P.2d at 1070 . Such an error should have been obvious to the court,
whch allowed Ostler to argue the issue even though it was not properly preserved. LI,
2000 Utah Ct. App. at Tf27, 996 P.2d at 1072.
In this case, the trial court did explain the maximum prison term of five years, but
failed to explain the maximum term of one year in jail if sentenced to probation. It was
particularly plain error in this case because Mr. Smif s criminal history put him in the
very comer of the probation area, as far from prison time as he could get. Additionally,
the State had promised to recommend probation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the court itself recognized the very real possibility of jail time as part of probation,
stating, "a recommendation to suspend the jail sentence, or to suspend the sentence can
only be interpreted to mean to suspend the prison sentence, not to send the defendant to
prison. It does not deal with the conditions of probation. This jail sentence that I've
imposed is a condition of probation." R. at 320, p. 12, lines 1-7.
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Because Mr. Smit did not understand the maximum sentence of one year in jail
for probation, he unknowingly and involuntarily entered his guilty plea to his detriment.
In accordance with strict-compliance nature of the Rule 11(e), Mr. Smit must be allowed
to withdraw his plea. Failure by the trial court to allow the plea withdrawal was plain
error outside the court's discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court must find the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow Mr. Smit to withdraw his guilty plea. The case should be remanded so
Mr. Smit may re-plead to the charges against him and exercise his constitutional right to a
trial if he should so wish.
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